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Abstract: There is a tension at the heart of Lucy Allais’ new account of 
Kant’s transcendental idealism. The problem arises from her use of two 
incompatible theories in contemporary philosophy – relationalism about 
perception, or naïve realism, and relationalism about colour, or more 
generally relationalism about any such perceptual property. The problem is 
that the former requires a more robust form of realism about the properties 
of the objects of perception than can be accommodated in the partially 
idealistic framework of the latter. On Allais’ interpretation, Kant’s notorious 
attempt to balance realism and idealism remains unstable. 
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1. 
 
Lucy Allais’ book is an extremely rich and wide-ranging work, complex and 
creative yet clear and compelling. It sheds new light on a host of traditional 
topics and will no doubt become an essential point of reference in future 
debate. One especially interesting and distinctive feature of the book is how 
it integrates familiar issues in Kant’s metaphysics and epistemology with 
novel and emerging ideas about his philosophy of perception. Another is 
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how it draws inspiration in this from a wide variety of views in 
contemporary philosophy. Two in particular are central to the book and 
they will be my focus here. 
 
First, in her account of intuition, Allais draws on a form of relationalism 
about perception (RP). Second, in her account of the properties of the 
objects of possible cognition, she draws on a form of relationalism about 
colour (RC). Both are central to the book because both are central to its 
account of transcendental idealism. The first provides resources for Allais’ 
account of Kant’s master argument for transcendental idealism. The second 
provides the structural core of her account of the nature of that idealism. 
 
In light of the nomenclature I have just employed, we might expect these 
two views to fit naturally together. Allais certainly does. Indeed, she says RC 
‘requires’ RP (121; cf. 16, 103, 117).1 I will argue, however, that not only do 
the views not fit naturally together or entail one another – they are 
fundamentally incompatible. One salient way to characterize the problem is 
that RP requires a more robust form of realism about the properties of the 
objects of perception than can be accommodated in the (at least partially) 
idealistic framework of RC. Though ingenious, Allais’ new interpretation of 
Kant’s notoriously diﬃcult balancing act leaves it unstable. 
 
In §2 I outline RP with a view to honing in on the tension with RC. In §3 I 
outline RC and explain the worry. Up to this point I focus exclusively on 
philosophical issues. In §4 I return to Kant and briefly explain why it will 
not help to appeal to diﬀerences between the Kantian and the contemporary 
contexts. I end with a proposal and a question. 
 
2. 
 
What is relationalism about perception, or RP? One core aspect of the view 
is the claim that perception essentially involves the subjects of perception 
standing in primitive, non-representational relations of conscious 
acquaintance to the objects of perception. The metaphysical nature of the 
relations in question is such that their obtaining – and therefore the 
occurrence of the perceptions that they (at least partially) constitute – 
necessarily implies the concurrent existence and presence to the subject of 
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the objects of perception. Note, however, that nothing has yet been said 
about the nature of these object-relata. So far, they are just whatever is 
perceived – those things, whatever they may be, to which the subject stands 
in the conscious acquaintance relation. More specifically, then, the form of 
relationalism that Allais draws on in her reading of Kantian intuition is one 
that takes the object-relata in such relations to include the kind of external, 
physical entities that populate our environment – things like apples and the 
trees they grow on. 
 
In this the view contrasts with an alternative which can also be classified as a 
form of relationalism because it likewise analyses perception in terms of 
primitive, non-representational relations of conscious acquaintance. The 
diﬀerence is that this alternative view then takes the object-relata in such 
relations always to be non-physical ‘sense-data’ – somewhat mysterious 
entities that are, at best, merely caused by external, physical things like 
apples and trees. It is thereby sometimes characterized as an indirect realist 
theory of perception in that it yields a distinction between the sense-data 
that are the only direct objects of perception – perception being essentially 
the subject’s conscious acquaintance with them – and the real world objects 
that might be counted as the indirect objects of perception in virtue of 
standing in the right kind of causal relations to sense-data. These causal 
relations might in turn be taken to ground representation relations and at 
this stage the view can also be called ‘representationalist’ in the rather 
restricted, ‘Cartesian’ sense in which Allais tends to employ that moniker, 
where the vehicle of representation is also the object of consciousness. But it 
is worth noting the initial, core similarity between these two views, in part 
because Allais does not, in part because it will be relevant below, and in part 
because she often proceeds as though they are the only options, for instance 
inferring the plausibility of one from the inadequacy of the other (11-12, 106, 
114, 154, 157). Non-relationalist, so-called ‘intentionalist’ versions of 
representationalism on which the vehicle of representation is not itself the 
object of consciousness get rather short shrift in the book. 
 
In any case, the particular form of relationalism that Allais draws on – what 
I am simply calling RP – is sometimes called a naïve realist theory of 
perception, and one way in which this name is fitting is that the view says 
that the direct objects of perception are what they naively seem to be – the 
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kind of external, physical entities that populate our environment. According 
to Allais, ‘intuitions involve the presence to consciousness of their objects’ 
(153), where ‘being perceptually presented with a particular involves a 
subject’s being aware of something outside of and other than themself, as 
opposed to being aware of a sensation, such as an itch, which is simply 
awareness of a state of the self ’ (154). 
 
Another way to characterize RP, and one which Allais makes much of (12, 
105ﬀ., 134, 197), is as the view that external, physical things can be literal 
constituents of perception. Or as she sometimes puts it: 
 
If an object is present to consciousness, it is not merely something 
that causally aﬀects a subject’s mental states. Rather, the object is 
in the subject’s consciousness; it is directly and immediately 
available in consciousness for the subject to attend to. (159) 
 
This does not mean that such objects are ‘in the mind’ in anything like the 
way that sensations or dreams might be said to be. That way lies the sense-
data view. According to RP, worldly objects can only be said to be in the 
mind to the extent that the mind can likewise be said to be in the world. 
Metaphors abound that run in both directions. In perception, the mind 
spreads itself on the world. In perception, the world is digested by the mind. 
How, then, more precisely, are we to understand RP’s particular constitution 
claim, the idea that external, physical objects can be in consciousness? 
 
Note that it would not suﬃce to appeal to the mere fact that RP analyses 
perception as a kind of existence-and-presence-entailing relation. Other 
views distinct from RP do this. One might, for instance, analyse perception 
in terms of suitable causal connections holding between subject and object, 
where ‘suitable’ demands existence and presence. But we are not tempted to 
characterize such views as ones on which the object of perception is a literal 
constituent of the state of perceiving it – object-dependent does not entail 
object-involving. And even if we were so tempted, the constitution claim 
would then not distinguish RP.2 RP claims precisely that there are extra-
causal conditions on perception. Instead, then, the answer to how we are to 
understand RP’s talk of constitution lies in its account of what in 
contemporary parlance gets called phenomenal character. 
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The phenomenal character of a state of perceiving consists of its 
phenomenal properties, roughly those properties that determine ‘what it is 
like’ or ‘how it feels’ for a subject to be in that state. RP says that (at least 
some of) these phenomenal properties just are properties of the perceived 
object. As Allais puts it, ‘the qualitative features of perceptual experience just 
are features of the objects perceived’ (107). Thus the redness in a visual 
perceptual appearance, for example, is the redness in the object perceived. It 
is in this way that the object counts as a literal constituent of the perception 
of it, as being in consciousness. 
 
The idea here, and one of the core motivations for contemporary versions of 
RP, is that this picture provides the best explanation of phenomenal 
character. And it is a reductive, naturalistic explanation. We do not need to 
appeal to shadowy mental paint, mysterious private objects, or raw 
subjective feels in order to explain perception and the character of 
phenomenal consciousness. We simply appeal to the familiar, everyday 
objects that we perceive and with which we are consciously acquainted. The 
heart of RP is an appeal to the properties of such objects as an explanation 
of perceptual appearances. 
 
And it is here that we come to the fundamental tension between RP and 
RC, between relationalism about perception and relationalism about colour. 
For in RC, this order of explanation is precisely the reverse. Where RP 
explains the phenomenal character of perception (at least partially) in terms 
of the properties of objects, RC explains what it is for objects to have certain 
properties (at least partially) in terms of the phenomenal character of 
perception. Combining RP and RC, were it possible at all, would lead to an 
explanatory circle that ultimately leaves us with no account of either 
phenomenon. 
 
3. 
 
What is relationalism about colour, or RC? One core aspect of the view is 
the claim that colours are relational properties of objects, properties ‘which 
are partly dependent on how coloured objects are in themselves and partly 
dependent on subjects (and also on environmental context)’ (122). As with 
 6 
RP, however, this core claim leaves a lot undetermined. In particular, 
nothing has yet been said about what in the subject acts as the relevant co-
determiner. More specifically, then, the particular form of relationalism 
about colour that Allais draws on to model the properties of cognizable 
objects – what I am simply calling RC – locates that co-determiner in the 
phenomenal character of the subject’s perceptual episodes. Colours, 
according to RC, are ‘qualities objects have only in their perceptual 
appearing to subjects like us’ (121) or ‘qualities which belong only to things’ 
perceptual appearing’ (122) – they are what Allais calls ‘essentially manifest 
qualities’ (117ﬀ.): 
 
they do not exist apart from the possibility of visual experience 
like ours, so being red, for example, is essentially a feature of the 
way an object looks. The intuitive thought is that it follows from 
this that there is an essential connection between redness and 
conscious experience (122-3)3 
 
RC is thereby supposed to accommodate two intuitive features of colour 
that can otherwise seem to pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, 
colour is presented to us in visual perception as a property of objects. It 
seems to us as though it is the apple that is red. Colour is more like shape 
than blurriness in this regard. On the other hand, it seems essential to 
colour that it is something presented in visual experience. Colour just is, so 
the claim goes, a feature of the way things appear, and thus dependent on or 
a feature of visual perception. By analyzing colours as relational, as 
properties of objects-as-they-appear-in-visual-perception, RC respects both 
ideas – it captures both the objective and subjective character of colour. 
 
Allais usefully contrasts RC with a variety of other views (118ﬀ.). ‘Scientific 
objectivism’, for example, identifies colours with object-properties like 
microphysical surface structure or causal power. It thereby respects the 
objective character of colour, but since such properties do not themselves 
‘manifest’ in perception – we are not perceptually acquainted with such 
properties – the view fails entirely to capture colour’s subjective character. At 
the other extreme there are ‘idealist’ views, which identify colours with 
purely mental entities like ideas or sensations. These views respect the 
subjective character of colour – its essential connection to perceptual 
 7 
appearances – but only at the expense of making it a property of subjects 
and their states rather than of objects. 
 
These and other contrasts that Allais draws are correct and apt. But what is 
relevant here is what RC shares with idealist views. In their respective, 
otherwise quite diﬀerent accounts of the nature of colour – in their 
respective explanations of what colour is – both kinds of view make 
ineliminable appeal to phenomenal character. And the problem is that RP, 
as an account of the nature of phenomenal character in terms of the nature 
of objects and their properties, can have no truck with any appeal to 
phenomenal character in an account of the properties of objects. The point 
can be put in terms of grounding rather than explanation. According to RP, 
facts about the properties of objects ground facts about phenomenal 
character. According to RC, facts about phenomenal character ground facts 
about the properties of objects. And we cannot have it both ways because 
grounding is an asymmetrical relation. 
 
Let me elaborate. Suppose we ask what it is for an object to be red. RC, 
according to Allais, says that an object is red ‘only if there is a way it would 
appear to subjects who are suitably situated and suitably receptive’ (123-4).4 
But now suppose we ask:  In what way? In what particular way would a red 
object appear? Well, red objects appear red. So the account looks in danger 
of empty circularity. It looks like it says merely that being red is a matter of 
appearing red. Now, theories like RC have a standard, two-step response to 
this worry. First, they propose an equivocation in the two uses of the term 
‘red’ in such statements. While the first occurrence names a (relational) 
property of the object, the second names a property of the subject, namely 
her being in a certain sensory state, a state with a certain phenomenal 
character. Second, they provide an internal, non-relational characterization 
of that state. What is crucial in this second step is that the account of the 
state of the subject make no appeal to the property of the object that 
brought it about or determined it, for we are precisely trying to give an 
account of that object-property – we are looking for the determining relata 
that together would individuate the object’s redness. But RP rejects such 
purely internal characterizations of sensory states because it reduces their 
phenomenal character properties to the properties of objects.  
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Consider the following toy case. In answer to our second question above, a 
subject perceiving a red object demonstratively picks out in introspection 
the relevant sensory state, an aspect of the phenomenal character of her 
perception of a red object – ‘the red object is appearing that way, which way 
I hereby dub “red*”’, she says. Thus the equivocation is explicit and 
circularity avoided – RC says that to be red is to appear in a red* way. But it 
is precisely this kind of move that RP blocks. For according to RP, what 
such a subject is ‘pointing to’ in our toy case is nothing but the property of 
the object – RP is the view that red*-ness is redness. 
 
In fact this is all a little too rough. Theories like RP tend to be presented as 
general theories, supposed to hold for all perception. This is how I presented 
it above, following Allais. This need not be the case, however, and localized 
versions of theories like RP and RC would be compatible so long as they 
kept fully separate, on the one hand, the properties of phenomenal character 
for which one gives a relationalist analysis in terms of the properties of 
objects, and on the other hand, and the properties of objects for which one 
gives a relationalist analysis (partially) in terms of the properties of 
phenomenal character. In principle there is no reason why one could not 
simultaneously maintain something like RP with regard to P-properties and 
something like RC with regard to Q-properties, if, and only if, the set of P-
properties does not overlap with the set of Q-properties. 
 
More carefully, then, the problem for Allais’ account is that it generalizes 
RC to provide the model for all possible properties of cognizable objects. 
According to Allais, the possible properties of such objects – Kantian 
‘appearances’ – are exactly those properties possibly manifest in perception. 
Hence the ‘perceptuals’ in my title. Allais’ concern is of course not only with 
colour but with any similarly perceptual property. This leaves no room for 
RP. Or coming from the other direction, Allais’ account mobilizes a general 
version of RP, leaving no room for RC, never mind a generalization of it. 
 
4. 
 
Where does this leave us? One response might be that it is far from clear the 
extent to which, if at all, Kant was concerned with anything like the notion 
of phenomenal character that has been my focus here. It certainly does not 
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follow merely from his use of related vocabulary. In particular, the reductive 
account in terms of which I have explained RP does not look especially 
Kantian, so surely it does not matter if this cannot be retained when the 
view is combined with RC. Such worries about Kantian provenance are well 
founded. Indeed, they are part of my point. But this response mislocates the 
force of my objection. I have argued that combining RP and RC is 
philosophically inconsistent. The problem is not just that one or other of 
the views loses some theoretical benefit when combined, but rather that it is 
far from clear that their combination even makes sense. And I do not think 
it would help to attempt to somehow divorce either of the views from 
considerations of phenomenal character. 
 
Take RC. One way of resolving the tension with RP would be to oﬀer the 
required, fully internal characterization of the subject-relata in bodily terms, 
as, for instance, and very roughly, features of the retina. Thus being red is a 
relational property of an object not insofar as the object phenomenally 
appears a certain way, but rather insofar as it produces a certain retinal 
eﬀect. Now, this is simply a diﬀerent view to RC, albeit one that might still 
be classified as relationalist. More importantly, however, it could no longer 
serve as a model for transcendental idealism. First, body-dependence is not 
mind-dependence, for Kant. Second, for Kant, bodily states are just as 
‘empirical’ as red apples, and thus would themselves be in need of the 
‘transcendental’, relationalist analysis. 
 
In any case, I think RC provides a brilliant and illuminating way of 
modeling Kant’s signature doctrine. The real culprit, in my view, is RP. I 
have argued elsewhere that the way RP would have us understand the 
‘immediacy’ of intuition, for example, cannot be the way Kant understands 
it.5 My point here can be seen as reinforcing and expanding that claim. 
Given her employment of RC, it cannot be the way Allais understands the 
immediacy of intuition either. 
 
For it is again far from clear whether it is so much as possible to separate RP 
from its reductive account of phenomenal character, without, that is, 
fundamentally changing or obscuring the nature of the view. We have seen 
that this account is how RP cashes out its talk of external objects being 
literal constituents of the state of perceiving them. Otherwise put – and I 
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think this is the real heart of the matter – how are we to understand RP’s 
special conscious acquaintance relation if not in terms of phenomenal 
character and specifically the claim that its properties just are those of the 
object? It was precisely this claim that gave us an idea of the way in which 
the relation was not only existence-and-presence-entailing but non-
representational and non-, or at least not merely, causal; it was precisely this 
that unpacked the notion of our immediate perceptual acquaintance with 
the world, this that constituted the way in which reality is manifest to us in 
perception. Yet it is precisely this that is stripped from the view when we try 
to combine it with RC. 
 
In eﬀect, then, I am recommending that Allais jettison RP. And so finally, it 
is useful to ask: What would be lost if she did? Significantly, I think the 
answer is: Not much. The central task of any account of intuition is to 
explain how it is able to play its role of ‘giving’ us objects for cognition, 
which is to say the role in virtue of fulfilling which it forms a necessary 
condition on cognition. After all, that intuition forms such a condition 
could well be described as the single most important commitment of the 
entire Critical philosophy. Allais understands cognition as a kind of singular 
thought, so we can be more specific with our question. What does it 
contribute to explaining its role in singular thought to construe intuition in 
terms of some special RP-style constitution relation, over and above some 
suitable causal or otherwise object-dependent relation? The widespread 
popularity of causal and otherwise non-RP accounts of singular thought is 
testament to the diﬃculty of answering this question. And without an 
answer – an answer which is only more elusive in the presence of RC – I 
cannot see what real theoretical work RP is doing for Allais’ Kant.6 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 All in-text references are to Allais (2015). 
2 It is worth noting that there are internal pressures elsewhere in Allais’ account 
that push in this direction. For example, Allais (270) says: ‘Kant thinks that for 
thought to have objective validity or relation to an object we require the possibility 
of acquaintance with the object – the possibility of being given the object in 
intuition’. So far, so good. But she then elaborates in a footnote: 
This is more demanding than just requiring a causal connection. 
However, Kant does not require that we have actual acquaintance with 
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all the things we can successfully think about; rather, it must be possible 
for us to have acquaintance with an object, and the object must be 
causally connected to one with which we have direct acquaintance. 
The purpose of this concession, I take it, is to make room for the actual cognition 
of objects that we cannot, with our current sensible faculties, actually intuit, such 
as magnetic matter or attractive force. But notice the structural similarity between 
this newly concessive model and the Cartesian sense-data model that Allais is at 
such pains to avoid. On the Cartesian model, we have direct acquaintance only 
with sense-data, but we can cognize external objects in virtue of their causal 
connections to the objects with which we have acquaintance. Similarly, Allais now 
concedes that we can cognize objects that are only causally connected to the objects 
with which have acquaintance. The only additional condition is that it must be 
possible for us to have acquaintance with such things. Thus if the Cartesian model 
can likewise allow this, even though as a matter of fact we are only acquainted with 
sense-data, then the upshot of the two views for cognition is exactly the same. To 
keep her view distinct in this regard, Allais needs to explain why the Cartesian 
model cannot make that allowance. Indeed, she needs to explain why Kant would 
be so adamant that the condition holds at all, and how her RP reading helps with 
this explanation – see §4. 
3 We have seen Allais talk variously about ‘the qualitative features of perceptual 
experience’, ‘perceptual appearing’, ‘looks’, and ‘conscious experience’, and I do the 
same – what is important here is that phenomenal character is at least part of what 
is at stake in these notions. 
4 Allais (123-4) distinguishes this conditional from the following, which she says is 
too weak to capture her view: ‘if something is coloured, then subjects in 
appropriate conditions, who are appropriately receptive, will perceive its colour’. 
Both seem too weak to me, almost platitudinous, but regardless of that, I am 
unsure what contrast she has in mind here. Normally, of course, both ‘p only if q’ 
and ‘if p then q’ get equivalent treatment as ‘p→q’. Given her talk of essential 
connections, I think the idea must be something like a strict implication reading of 
the former and a material implication reading of the latter. 
5 See Stephenson (2015). 
6 For helpful discussion, my thanks to Catharine Diehl, Craig French, Anil Gomes, 
Nora Kreft, and Rory Madden, as well as to participants in a symposium on the 
book in Johannesburg, especially Thad Metz for organizing and of course Lucy 
Allais herself. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Leverhulme Trust. 
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